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Abstract 
Access to justice is a core fundamental right and a central concept in the broader field of 
justice. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 is a complex body of rules. 
Article 6 of the Convention was inspired by Article 10 and 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human  rights  of  1948.  It  has  also  its  counterpart  –  with  minor  differences  in  Article  14  of  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 1966. Article 6, which guarantees the right to 
fair trial, occupies a central place in the system of the Convention. it is a generally agreed that this 
provision is the most frequently cited one of the Convention, both at the national and international 
levels. This Article contains a variety of rights which are all related to the good administration of 
justice, not only criminal, but also in the civil  and administrative matters. The ‘independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law’ is one of textual elements of the Fair Trial Right, as long as it 
has direct and explicit expression in the text of Convention. Even in simple logical way it can be 
considered as a suite of requirements referring to 1) the notion of tribunal 2) its attribute of being 
established by law 3) being independent and 4) being impartial. 
Keywords: access to justice, tribunal, independent, impartial, applicability. 
I. Introduction 
If the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court was an ocean, the Article 6 jurisprudence 
would be an ocean in ocean.
1 On one hand, it has crucial role in developing and strengthening 
national judiciary, in increasing its reasonableness and predictability,  in pushing the national 
investigating bodies to give up the archaically practice of oppressing the accused and, after 
all, in securing Human Rights. On the other hand, the  fair trial cases have been periodically 
giving the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) an opportunity to enhance its protective 
role, to develop its interpretative doctrines and to fortify its magnificence as the most effective 
supranational (and international) human rights protection instrument.
2 
In contrast to the guarantees provided  by paragraph 2 and 3 of Article, which are 
applicable only in the context of criminal proceedings, paragraph 1 of the same provision has 
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1 Historically, Article 6 of the Convention was inspired by Article 10 and 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948. It has also its counterpart  – with minor differences in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966. 
2 The Court has pointed out that 'Article 6 enunciates the rights which are distinct but stem from the same basic idea and 
which, taken together, make up a single right not specifically defined in the narrower sense of the term'. See Golder judgment 
of 21 February 1975, Series A, No. 18, p.13, pr.28. Moreover, the Court has sometimes described the right guaranteed by 
Article  6  as  'right  to  good  administration  of  justice'.  The  expression  'the  right  to  fair  administration  of  justice'  which 
sometimes is used for its conciseness and convenience . . . does not appear in the text of  Article 6 , and can also be 
understood as referring only to the work and not to the organisation of justice. See Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1990, 
Series A, No.11, p.11, pr.25. The Court now generally refers to Article 6 of the Convention as guaranteeing 'the rights to a 
fair trial'. See Golder judgment, p.18. Elena ANDREEVSKA  237 
 
wider scope of 'civil rights and obligations' beside 'the criminal charge'.
3 Furthermore,  a 
broad construction of the 'civil rights and obligations' in Article 6(1) would then cover all the 
rights  or obligations enforceable by law, regardless  of whether the parties  are individuals, 
corporations or public authorities or the State itself.  
Active and protective jurisprudence of ECHR has been changing the very structure of 
Article 6 mosaic as whole. If we draw up the construction of Fair Trial Article following 
strictly the text in the Convention and then outline its state it result of Court’s jurisprudence, 
we will have basically dissimilar pictures. The Court itself repeatedly emphasizes that the 
Article 6 protection “… has undergone a considerable evolution in the Court’s case-law …”
4 
The ‘independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ is one of textual elements 
of  the  Fair  Trial  Right,  as  long  as  it  has  direct  and  explicit  expression  in  the  text  of 
Convention.  This  provision  deals,  in  principle,  with  the  question  whether  a  certain 
disciplinary  or  administrative  body  determining  a  dispute  has  the  characteristics  of  a 
“tribunal” or “court” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6, even if it is not termed a 
“tribunal” or “court” in the domestic system.
5 This is the only provision of Article 6 which 
explicitly  refers  back  to  domestic  law,  warranting  a  certain  degree  of  inquiry  into 
“lawfulness” from the Court. At the same time, there is a strong presumption that domestic 
courts  know  the  rules  of  jurisdiction  better,  and  if  the  matter  of  jurisdiction  is  properly 
discussed at the domestic level the Court would tend to agree with the domestic courts in a 
decision on competence to hear the case.
6 
The body need not be part of the ordinary judicial machinery), and the fact that it has 
other functions besides a judicial one does not necessarily render it outside the notion  of a 
“tribunal”
7. The term established by law is intended to ensure that the judicial organization 
does not depend on the discretion of the executive, but that it is regulated by law emanating 
from parliament. Members of the body do not necessarily have to be lawyers or qualified 
judges
8. The body must have the power to make binding decisions,
9 and not merely tender 
advice or opinions, even if that advice is usually followed in practice.
10 
One of the elements essential for the notion of “tribunal” for the purposes of Article 6 
(1)  is  the  existence  of  power  to  decide  matters  “on  the  basis  of  rules  of  law,  following 
proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner”.
11 This principle has been established by the 
Court, mutatis mutandis, in case of Stromek v. Austria.
12 
The  Court’s  jurisprudence  is  much  richer  in  interpreting  and  applying  the 
‘independence’  and  ‘impartiality’  requirements  than  ‘tribunal  established  by  law’. 
                                                 
3 In this context, the Court points out that: 'Paragraph 3 of Article 6 contains an enumeration of specific applications of the 
general principle stated in paragraph 1 of the Article 6. The various rights of which a non-exhaustive list appears in paragraph 
3, reflect certain aspects of the notion of a fair trial in criminal proceedings. When compliance with paragraph 3 is being 
reviewed, its basic purpose must not be forgotten nor must it be severed from its roots'. See Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, 
Series A. No. 37, p. 15, pr.32. Moreover, the Court has pointed out that ' The Contracting States enjoy a wide discretion as 
regards the choice of means calculated to ensure that their legal systems are in compliance with the requirements of Article 6 
(1) in this filed. The Court's task is not to include those means to the states, but to determine whether the result called for the 
Convention has been achieved'. See Colozza judgment   of 12 February 1985, Series A, No. 212-C, p. 26, para.26. 
4 Borgers v. Belgium, 30/10/1991, Appl. No. 12005/86, A214-B, para.24. 
5 H. v. Belgium, 30 November 1987, paras.50-55. 
6 Khodorkovskiy (No.2) v. Russia, 8 November 2011. 
7 See H. v. Belgium, Publication A 127 B. 
8 See Ettl v. Austria, paras. 36-41, Publication A117A. 
9 See Sramek v. Austria, paras 36-42, Publication A084.  
10 See judgment Compbell and Fells, paras. 32-33; and judgment H v. Belgium, para. 50. 
11 Case of Sramek v. Austria, judgment of 22 October, 1984, Application no. 8790/79, para. 36.  
12 Where the applicant complained the violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR claiming th at the Regional Real Property 
Transnational Authority that examined her case on the domestic level was not independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. Despite the regional Authority was not classified as a court under the Austrian law, the Court concluded that “for the 
purposes of Article 6, however, it comes within the concept ‘tribunal’ in the substantive sense of this expression: its function 
is to determine matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law, following proceedings conducted in the prescribed 
manner. Ibid. 238    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Public Law 
 
Nevertheless the latter is also attractive, since – though in fewer cases – it has given (and still 
gives)  the  Court  opportunity  to  develop  its  jurisprudence  in  means  of  both  textual  and 
contextual interpretation. 
As  a  final  point,  the  right  to  a  trial  before  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal 
established  by  law  engages  three  principles  considerations:  first,  that  the  tribunal  is  one 
established by law; second, that the tribunal is competent to decide on matters brought before 
it; and, third, that the tribunal is both independent and impartial. It is the independence and 
impartiality  of  courts  and  tribunals  that  the  Human  Rights  Committee  and  ECHR  have 
focused most on. Claims brought before the Committee and the Court frequently mix issues 
of competence, establishment, independence and impartiality and, where this occurs, matters 
are often decided on the question of independence and impartiality. 
II. Paper Content 
1. Tribunal Established by Law 
The survey of international and regional human rights instruments shows that they all 
provide for the guarantee to a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by 
law.
13 The common elements to all these texts appear to be  tribunal, independent, impartial, 
and established by law. Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the American Court on Human Rights require that the tribunal be “competent”: 
a requirement which, under the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR), can be construed 
as being equivalent to the term established by law.
14  
The expression “established by law” is not defined in the ICCPR or the ECHR but 
includes two key requirements: first, that the judicial system is established and sufficiently 
regulated by law emanating from Parliament; and, second, that each tribunal is established, in 
the case of all hearings, in accordance with the legal requirements for its establishment.
15  
The concept 'tribunal' is interpreted by the Court in an autonomous manner. The 
classification in the domestic legal system is not decisive for the qualification of a certain 
authority as a 'tribunal' within the meaning of Article 6. In the case of Ringeisen the Court had 
to decide whether Article 6 was applicable in an Austrian dispute concerning the purchase of 
some  property.  The  proceedings  took  place  before  an  administrative  authority 
(Grundverkehrsbehörde). The Court held that the character of the authority which is invested 
with  jurisdiction  in  the  matter  (ordinary  court,  administrative  body,  etc.)  is  of  little 
consequence, so it concluded that the body was a 'tribunal'.
16 
Furthermore, The Court has developed its own substantive requirements of a 'tribunal'. 
According to the jurisprudence of the Court, a 'tribunal' is 
"[...] characterized in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function, that is 
to say determining matters within its competence on the basis of r ules of law and after 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 8(1) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights Law; and Article 7(a), (b) and (d) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
14 For the purposes of Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR, criminal and civil proceedings must be conducted 
by a “tribunal established by law”. This requirement, according to the European Court of Human Rights, embodies the 
principle of the rule of law inherent in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols. A body 
that has not been set up in accordance with the will of the people, i.e., as expressed through the law, would necessarily lack 
the legitimacy that is needed in a democratic society for such a body to hear the case of individuals. See Lavents v Latvia 
[2002] ECHR 786, para 114, available in French only. 
15 Consideration also needs to be had to the question of ad hoc or special tribunals and the fact there is no right to trial by 
jury. 
16  See Ringeisen - Austria judgment of 16 July 1971 (Series A-16), paaras.94 and 95. Elena ANDREEVSKA  239 
 
proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner [...] It must also satisfy a series of further 
requirements  -  independence,  in  particular  of  the  executive;  impartiality;  duration  of  its 
members' terms of office; guarantees afforded by its procedure - several of which appear in 
the text of Article 6 para.1 itself."
17 
Consequently, the notion of ‘tribunal’ under Article 6 can be analyzed in the light of 
Court’s case-law under the other relevant provisions of the Convention. 
In Neumeister case the Strasbourg Court, under Article 5, points at the independence 
from “both of the executive and of the parties to the case” as sine qua non feature of ‘judicial 
character’ of the ‘authority called upon to decide’ the case
18. 
In De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment the Court acknowledged the ‘guarantees of 
judicial procedure’ as another ‘common fundamental feature’ of the notion of forum.
19 
In  Ringeisen  (already  Article  6  case)  the  Court  was  to  decide  whether  an 
administrative body (‘Regional Commission’) can pretend to be a ‘tribunal’ under the Article 
6. The Court recalled the tests for ‘tribunal’ in Neumeister and De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp 
and  as  an  additional  test  pointed  at  the  term  of  office  of  the  body
20.  Also  the  term 
‘guarantees of judicial procedure’ was paraphrased into ‘proceedings before ... [tribunal 
to] afford the necessary guarantees’
21 in order to avoid the word ‘judicial’, evoking the 
traditional judiciary very in too direct manner. 
Considering  and  applying  those  tests  in  Ringeisen,  the  Court  held  that  ‘Regional 
Commission’ is a ‘tribunal’ under the Article 6. 
Thus, the term ‘tribunal’ in Article 6 was subjected to autonomous interpretation by 
Strasbourg Court, so akin to the ‘criminal charge’ clause, ‘tribunal’ (under Article 6) must not 
be defined exclusively referring to national law. Nonetheless, in Belilos, decided in 1988, 
Court held that the description of body in question in national law is also important, though 
not decisive
22. 
Several elements are contained in these substantive requirements: 
  Firstly, a 'power of decision'
23. The Commission in the  Sramek case formulated this 
requirement in a slightly clearer manner: "[...] a tribunal, being an authority with power 
to decide legal disputes with binding effects for the parties".
24 Soyer and De Salvia have 
argued that this implies  the following: “Il faut donc que le tribunal soit  en mesure 
d’appr￩cier, par lui même, l’ensemble des ￩l￩ments – de fait ou de droit – conduisant ￠ 
la solution du litige”.
25 
  Secondly, the body needs to operate "on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings 
conducted in a prescribed manner".
26 
                                                 
17  See Demicoli – Malta of 27 August 1991 (Series A-210), para.39. See also: ECHR, 29 April 1988, Belilos - Switzerland 
(Series A-132), para.64. 
18 See De Wilde, para.78. 
19 See De Wilde, para.78. Nevertheless, the requirement of ‘guarantees of judicial procedure’ remained vague in De Wilde, 
Ooms and Versyp. 
20 See Ringesen v. Austria, 16/07/1971, Appl. no. 2614/65, A13, para.95. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. para.95. 
23 Such a ‘power of decision’ is also required by the Court when it interprets similar concepts in Article 5 para.3 (see, for 
example,  the  case  of  Assenov  described  in  ***  Chapter  4  para.3.1  ***),  Article  5  para.4  (see,  for  example,  Van 
Droogenbroeck – Belgium of 24 June 1982 (Series A-50), para.50 and Benjamin and Wilson – United Kingdom of 26 
September 2002 (appl. no. 28212/95), para.34) and in Article 13. 
24 EComHR, 8 December 1982, Sramek - Austria (to be found in Series A-84), para.71. 
25 Terra Woningen – Netherlands of 17 December 1996 (Reports 1996, 2105), para.52: “[…] it is required that the ‘tribunal’ 
in question have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it”. 
26 A similar criterion is used when interpreting the notion ‘officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power’ used in 
Article 5 para.3.In the Schiesser case the Court stated that the officer should decide “by reference to legal criteria”. 240    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Public Law 
 
  Thirdly,  the  body  needs  to  determine  "matters  within  its  competence".  This,  both 
comprises material and territorial jurisdiction.
27 
  Lastly, a reference is made to other substantive requirements of Article 6 ECHR, such as 
judicial independence and impartiality. In the Benthem case the Court stated: 
“[...] by the word ‘tribunal’, it denotes 'bodies which exhibit [...] common fundamental 
features', of which the most important are independence and impartiality.”
28 
The prescription that the tribunal mast be ‘established by law’ implies the guarantee 
that the organization of the judiciary in democratic society is not left to the discretion of 
executive, but is regulated by law. In Commission’s view this does not, however, rule out 
possibility that parts of this organization, e.g., the institution of specific judicial bodies, may 
be left by law to the executive by virtue of delegation provided that sufficient guarantees are 
built in to counteract arbitrariness.
29 And in any case no right to be tried by the ordinary court 
can be inferred from the provision, provided that a legal basis is present for the special court 
as well.
30 In its Report in the Piersack Case the Commission evidently takes the view that not 
only  the  establishment,  but  also  the  organization  and  the  functioning  of  the  tribunal  in 
question must have a legal basis, but for the question of whether this tribunal has applied 
these legal rules in the right way it apparently relies on the opinion of the (higher) national 
court.
31 
Finally,  military  and  special  courts  are  also  covered  by  term  “tribunal”  for  the 
purposes of Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. Usually, the aim of 
creation of military or special courts is that states try to create the bodies which are distinct 
from the ordinary court system and are subjected to special rules and procedures; especially 
interesting are instances where special or military tribunals which are entitled under domestic 
law  to  try  civilians.  Therefore  the  Court  as  well  as  the  Committee  subjects  them  to  the 
requirements of the autonomous meaning of “tribunal” established in their case law.
32 
2. Independent and Impartial Tribunal  
The  requirement  of  an  ‘independent’  and’  impartial’  tribunal  is  one  of  the  key 
parameters of the right to a fair trial, and thus vital to the protection of constitutional and 
human rights, is not questionable. Originally, this requirement was conceived to address the 
inherent deficiencies posed by special jurisdictions, in particular tribunals set up ex post, for 
trying cases with political implications.
33 
                                                 
27 Mort – United Kingdom of 6 September 2001 (appl. no. 44564/98). 
28 Benthem - Netherlands of 23 October 1985 (Series A-97), para. 43. See also: Neumeister - Austria of 27 June 1968 (Series 
A-8), para.24; De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp - Belgium of 18 June 1971 (Series A-12), para.78;  Ringeisen - Austria of 16 July 
1971 (Series A-13), para.95. 
29 Report of 12 October 1978, Zand, D&R 15 (1979), p. 70 (79-81); report of 14 December 1979, Le Compte, Van Louven. 
30 Appl. 8299/78, X and Y v. Ireland, D&R 22 (1981), p.51 (73). 
31 Report of 13 May 1981, B, 47 (1986), p. 23. In this case the Court did not deal with this point after it had held the 
complaint concerning the violation of the requirement of impartiality to be well-founded. See Judgment of 1 October 1982, 
A. 53, p. 16. Also, in the Bulut Case, however, the Court took the interpretation of domestic law by the national courts, like in 
the Commission in the Piersack Case, more or less for granted. See Judgment of 22 February 1996, Reports 1996-II, Vol. 5, 
para. 29. 
32 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 14. 
 
33 See also the findings of the UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 
at 14 (1994), para. 4; See e.g. the ECHR decision in Rotaru v Romania, (2000) 21/4-7 HRLJ 231, para. 62; Pfeifer and Plankl 
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The words “independent and impartial tribunal” were used in the first draft of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).
34 Without doubt, the independence and 
impartiality of a tribunal is a central pillar of the right to a fair hearing.
35 Moreover, the 
principle that a court of law should be independent and impartial is firmly embedded in all 
legal  systems  and  in  all  major  international  human  rights  instruments.  Indisputably,  this 
requirement  constitutes  a  general  principle  of  law  and  it  gives  rise  to  one  of  the  most 
fundamental of human rights.
36 
The  adjectives  ‘independent’  and  ‘impartial’  are  the  expression  of  two  different 
concepts. The notion of ‘independence’ refers to the connection between the judge and the 
administration,  whereas  the  ‘impartiality’  must exist  in  relation  to  the parties  to  the  suit. 
However, the Court has not always drown a clear borderline between the two concepts.
37 
The distinction between  judicial  independence  and  judicial  impartiality  has  been 
addressed by both domestic and international jurisprudence. In the Valente case, the Canadian 
Supreme Court held as follows:
38 
Although recognizing the ‘close relationship’ between the two, they are nevertheless 
separate  and  distinct  requirements.  Specifically,  impartiality  refers  to  a  state  of  mind  or 
attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case. The word 
“independent”, however, connotes not only the state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise 
of the judicial functions, but a status or relationship with others, particularly to the Executive 
Branch of government, that rests on the objective conditions or guarantees.  
Also  in  Canada,  in  the  Lippe  case,  the  then  Chief  Justice  Lamer  stated  that:
39… 
judicial  independence  is  critical  to  the  public’s  perception  of  impartiality;  judicial 
independence is the cornerstone, a necessary prerequisite, for judicial impartiality. 
In this context, impartiality is viewed as wider than independence, in that a tribunal 
can  be  independent  and  yet  be  biased  against  one  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute.
40Also, 
impartiality is a guarantee that is linked to the principle of equality before courts and tribunals 
and involves the idea that everyone should be treated the same. It requires that judicial 
officers exercise their function without personal bias or prejudice and in a manner that offers 
sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt of their impartiality.
41 
In contrast with the above jurisprudence, it appears that the ECHR does not attach 
much importance to the distinction between judicial independence and impartiality. Thus, in 
Findlay v United Kingdom, the ECHR held as follows:
42 
                                                 
34 For more on this, see Stefan Trechsel, Human rights in criminal proceedings, Vol.XII/3 (Oxford University Press, 2005),` p 
45; David Weissbrodt,  The right to a fair trial: Article 8, 10, and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The 
Hague: Kluwern Law International, 2001),  pp 13–15, 17, 33, 45–46, 51–52, 54. 
35 Delcourt v Belgium [1970] ECHR 1, para 25; and De Cubber v Belgium [1984] ECHR 14, para 30. Also, see Document of 
the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow 
1991, para 19.2, page 113. See also, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 
1985 by the UN General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 and 40/146. 
36 Antonio Cassesse,   International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp 393–394. 
37 The principles established in the Court’s case-law with regard to the notions of independence and impartiality apply as well 
to professional judges and lay judges as to jurors. See Judgment of 22 June 1989, Langborger, A. 155, pp. 15-16; judgment 
of 23 April 1996, Remli, Reports 1996-II, Vol. 8, paras 46-48; judgment of 10 June 1996, Pullar, Reports 1996-III, Vol. 11, 
paras 31-32. 
38 Valente [1985] SCR 673, 23 CCC 3d 193 (Can. 1985), pp. 201–202. 
39 Lippe [1991] 2 SCR 114, 64 CCC 3d 513, 530. 
40 The requirement of independence means, in general terms, that tribunals should be free from any form of direct or indirect 
influence, whether this comes from the government, from the parties in the proceedings or from third parties, such as the 
media. See UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 25; Ringeisen v Austria [1971] ECHR 2, 
para 95; and Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium [1981] ECHR 3, para 55. See also, UN Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 1985 by the UN General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 and 40/146, para 4: 
“There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process”. 
41 See, for example, Grieves v the United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 688, para 69. 
42 Findlay v United Kingdom, Reports 1997 – I, 263, (1997) 24 EHRR 211, para. 73; also 
Incal v Turkey, Reports 1998 – IV, 1547, (2000) 29 EHRR 449, para. 65; Sener v Turkey, 
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The concepts of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked and the 
court will consider them together as they relate to the present case. 
In the Ringeisen case the Court held that the Regional Commission could be regarded 
as a ‘tribunal’ as it was ‘independent of the executive and also of the parties’. The latter 
element, however, refers in fact not to the independence but to the required impartiality of the 
court. The Court added that the members of the Regional Commission had been appointed for 
five years and the proceedings before it did offer the necessary guarantees.
43The comparable 
line of reasoning was developed in the Langborger Case: 
In order to establish whether a body can be considered ‘independent’ regard must be 
had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, to the 
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents 
an appearance of independence.
44 
These various characteristics of the notion of independence seems to fall into three 
categories. Firstly, the tribunal must function independently of the executive, base its decision 
on its own free opinion about facts and legal grounds. Secondly, there must be guarantees to 
enable the court to function independently. 
45Thirdly, even a semblance of dependence must 
be avoided.
46 
However, this aspect no longer refers to the independence, but to the impartiality of 
the court. Impartiality is also one of the fundamental characteristics of a tribunal. Deriving 
from the inherent power of judicial authorities to ensure the proper and orderly functioning of 
proceedings is the ability of judicial officers to hold persons in contempt of court.
47 Measures 
ordered by courts under contempt of court procedures have been described as akin to the 
exercise of disciplinary powers.
48 They must be exercised only for their legitimate purpose, 
i.e., ensuring the proper and orderly functioning of proceedings, and must not be used by 
judicial officers in a way that would undermine the actual or apparent impartiality of the judge 
(See also 3.3.2) or otherwise interfere with the practical enjoyment of fair trial rights.
49 
It  is  of  fundamental  importance  in  a  democratic  society  that  the  courts  inspire 
confidence in the public.
50 To that end, both the ICCPR and ECHR require a tribun al falling 
within the scope of Articles 14 and 6 respectively to be impartial. The requirement of 
impartiality has two features: first, that judges do not allow their judgment to be influenced by 
personal bias or prejudice, nor harbor preconceptions about the particular case before them – 
referred to as subjective impartiality; and, second, that the tribunal must also appear to the 
reasonable observer to be impartial – referred to as objective impartiality.
51 The Court has 
                                                                                                                                                         
No. 26680/95, (2003) 37 EHRR 34, para. 56. 
43 Judgment of 16 July 1971, A. 13, p. 39. 
44 Judgment of 22 June 1989, A. 155, p. 16. See also the judgment of 29 April 1988,  Belilos, A. 132, p. 29; judgment of 28 
September 1995, Procola, A. 326, p. 16; and judgment of 29 November 1995, Bryan, A. 335-A, p. 15. 
45 As far as the latter requirement is concerned, it is not necessary that the judges have been appointed for life, provided tha t 
they cannot be discharged at will or on improper grounds by the authorities. Implicitly the judgment of 16 July 1971, 
Ringeisen, A.13. Explicitly the  report of 12 October 1978, Zand, D&R 15 (1979), p. 70 (81-82), and the report of 14 
December 19979, Le Compte, Van Leunen and De Mayere, B.38 (1984), p. 40. 
46 In the Bryan Case the Court held that the very existence of the power of the Secretary of State to revoke the power of an 
inspector to decide an appeal under the Town and Country Planning Act was enough to  deprive the inspector from the 
appearance of independence. See Judgment of 22 November 1995, A.335-A, para. 38. Also, in the   Sramek Case, where a 
member of the court was hierarchically subordinate to one of the parties to the suit, the Court held:’ Litigants affects the 
confidence which the court must inspire in a democratic society’. Judgment of 22 October 1984, A.84, pp. 19-20. 
47 Ravnsborg v Sweden [1994] ECHR 11, para 34. 
48 Ibid. 
49 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 25. 
50 See Padovani v Italy [1993] ECHR 12, para 27; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 118; Farhi v France [2007] 
ECHR 5562, para 23; Jasinski v Poland [2005] ECHR 883, para 53. 
51 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 21; Karttunen v Finland, HRC Communication 
387/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (1992), para 7.2; Perterer v Austria, HRC Communication 1015/2001, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001  (2004),  paras  10.2–10.4;  Castedo  v  Spain,  HRC  Communication  1122/2002,  UN  Doc 
CCPR/C/94/1122/2002 (2008), para 9.5; Piersack v Belgium [1982] ECHR 6, para 30; Incal v Turkey [1998] ECHR 48, para 
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recognized the difficulty of establishing a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR on account of 
subjective partiality and, for this reason, has in the vast majority of cases focused on the 
objective aspects of impartiality.
52 However, there is no clear-cut division between the two 
notions since the conduct of a judge may not only prompt misgivings as to impartiality from 
the point of view of the external observer (objective test) but may also go to the issue of 
her/his personal conviction (subjective test).
53 
Subjective  impartiality  is  obviously  dif ficult  to  assess.
54  The  Court  therefore 
cautiously likes to repeat that ‘the personal impartiality of judge is to be presumed until there 
is proof to the contrary’.
55 
The objective approach refers to the question whether the way in which the tribunal is 
composed and organized, or whether a certain coincidence or succession of functions of one 
of its members, may give rise to doubt as to the impartiality of the tribunal or that member. If 
there is reason for such doubt, even if subjectively there is no concrete indication of partiality 
of person in question, this already amounts to an inadmissible jeopardy of the confidence 
which  the  court  must  inspire  in  a  democratic  society.
56  The fear that the tribunal or a 
particular judge lacks impartiality must ‘be held to be objectively justified’, so the standpoint 
of the accused on this matter, although important, is not decisive.
57 This objective-approach-
test has been applied in several cases.
58  
There is no doubt that ensuring the independence and impartiality of the ju dges is not 
only the responsibility of States. It is also the responsibility of Judges themselves. An 
important milestone in this context is the development of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct,
59 developed by Judges, for Judges. They were tentatively developed in 2000 but are 
now increasingly seen as a reference document which all judiciaries and legal systems can 
accept. Its principles describe the professional and ethical code of conduct for Judges and also 
outline in a more practical way what  exactly the concept of independence and impartiality 
mean for them. The six values described in the Bangalore Principles are independence, 
impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, competence and diligence. Security of tenure, 
financial security and institutional interference are highlighted as important conditions for 
independence and it is also stressed that objective or subjective independence do not suffice. 
The judiciary should also be perceived as independent and impartial, and any test should 
include that perception. It is interesting to note that the document also stresses the fact that 
due consideration of a case should take precedence over „productivity‟. After all, judges have 
                                                                                                                                                         
65; and Wettstein v Switzerland [2000] ECHR 695, para 42; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 118; Sara Lind 
Eggertsdottir v Iceland [2007] ECHR 553, para 41. 
52 Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 119. 
53 Ibid. 
54 For an example, see the Bockmans case, which ended in a friendly settlement in front of the Commission in 1965. 
55 De Cubber judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 14, para. 25. 
56 See the judgment of 1 Ostober 1982,  Piersack, A 53; judgment of 26 October 1984, De Cubber, A. 86; judgment of 25 
June 1992, Thorgeir Thorgeirson,  A. 239; judgment of 24 February 1993, Fey, A.255-A; judgment of 26 February 1993, 
Padovani, A.257-B.  
57 Judgment of  24 May 1989,  Hauschildt, A.154, p.21; judgment of 25 June 1992, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, A.239, p. 23; 
judgment of 24 February 1993, Fay, A. 255, p. 12; judgment of 26 February 1993, Padovani, A.257-B, p.20.  
58 See Judgement of 24 August 1993, Nortier, A.267,p.15; judgement of 22 April 1994, Saravia de Carvalho, A.286-B, p.38; 
judgment  of  24  May  1989,  Hauschieldt,  A.154,  p.  22;  judgment  of  16  December  1992,  Sainte-Marie,  A253-A,  p.  16; 
judgment 24 May 1989, A.154, p. 23; judgment of 24 August 1993, Nortier, A.267, p. 16; judgment of 22 April 1994, 
Saravia de Carvolho, A.286-B, p. 39; judgment of 26 October 1984, D Cubber, A 86, pp. 15-16; report of 7 May 1985, 
Yaacoub, A.127, pp. 11-13; judgment of 29 April 1988, Belilos, A.132, p. 30. See also the judgment of 24 February 1993, 
Fey, A.255-A, pp. 13-14 and compare the Thorgeir Thorgeirson Case, judgment of 25 June 1992, A.239, pp. 23-24, where 
the applicant’s claim that the court lacked impartiality because it had taken over the public prosecutor’s functions in the legal 
absence of the latter, was not upheld by the Court, and the judgment of 22 February 1996, Bulut, Reports 1996-II, Vol. 5, 
para. 34, concerning a judge who had questioned witnesses in the pre-trial phase. 
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the privilege to put human rights into action. Their selection, resources, training and conduct 
are therefore of the utmost importance.  
III. Conclusion 
The main difference of the requirement of “fairness” from all the other elements of 
Article 6 is that it covers proceedings as a whole, and the question whether a person has had a 
“fair” trial is looked at  by way of cumulative analysis of all the stages, not merely of a 
particular incident or procedural defect; as a result, defects at one level may be put right at a 
later stage.
60 
The  assessment  of  the  notion  of  a  “tribunal  established  by  law”  involves  a  more 
general examination of the statutory structure upon which the whole class of the bodies in 
question is set up; it does not, as a rule, pertain to the examination of the competence of a 
particular body in the circumstances of each and every case – such as the reassessment of 
domestic lawfulness  of  the territorial  or hierarchical  jurisdiction of a certain  court or the 
composition of the bench which dealt with the applicant’s grievances.  
Only in some very exceptional cases does the Court undertake to examine the notion 
of a “tribunal established by law” as including domestic lawfulness of the composition of the 
bench; the standard of proof in this respect is very stringent, and a total absence of domestic 
statutory basis – rather than a mere doubt or insufficiency of competence by a particular body 
or its member – must be shown by the applicant.. 
The requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal established by law is one of 
the  key  components  of  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and,  therefore,  vital  to  the  protection  of 
individual rights, is not questionable. This is because the guarantee ensures that individual 
rights of parties to a dispute are decided by a neutral authority or body, be it judicial or quasi-
judicial.  On  the  other  hand,  the  guarantee  of  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal  is 
considered as the foundation of the rule of law. Indeed, without an independent and impartial 
judiciary, one may wonder whether the law itself can have a real meaning.
61 
Notwithstanding to above, it is to be born in mind that there is no such thing as ‘pure 
judicial independence and impartiality’. Naturally, in the exercise of their judicial functions, 
judges, as a human beings, will be influenced by the prevailing political, social and economic 
conditions in their respective jurisdictions.
62 In addition, judicial decision, make often than 
not, are influenced by a judge’s personal history. Everyone has personal history that affects 
their  judgment  pervasively.  Thus,  through  personal  history  can  be  a  cause  of  judicial 
fallibility, it is perhaps absurd to hold that a judge should decide as s/he had not personal 
history. 
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